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I recently came upon an extraordinary book review, probably the most 
extraordinary review F ve seen in years in a proper professional journal. I mention 
it because it's a review of Murray Murphey's most extraordinary book. 
There are, of course, lots of reviewers who don't really understand the book 
they're reviewing. But most of them think they do understand, and most of those 
who suspect they don't do their damnedest to escape exposure. Mark Hamilton 
Lytle simply admits from the start that he is in over his head. He's got to fill 
perhaps 600 words without embarrassing himself. At one point he hits upon the 
expedient of reproducing verbatim the eight premises that inform Murray's 
argument; and as those eight premises sit there, neatly numbered, on the august 
pages of the Journal of American History, taking up fully a fourth of the review, 
it is impossible not to imagine Lytle congratulating himself on this inspired ploy. 
Indeed, as he approaches the conclusion of his assignment, it is impossible not to 
imagine him heaving a sigh of relief to be so near the end of his ordeal. 
Nonetheless, Lytle is an honest man. Once safely arrived at his summation, 
he admits openly what he has already implied. "This book is not beach reading," 
he confides. "It will appeal only to those historians with a taste for metaphysics. 
Sadly, this reviewer is not one of them." 
Of course, it would please me profoundly to say that / polished Murray's 
book off at the beach last summer. But the truth is, I probably don't understand 
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it either. Murray is simply smarter than the rest of us are, or at any rate he's smarter 
than I am. Besides, he's outlandishly more widely read, in formal philosophy, in 
several sorts of academic psychology, in mathematics, in science, and even, I 
discover, in the history and analysis of dead languages. 
It's not for nothing that he was my idol when I was an undergraduate and that 
he's my idol still. 
Rather than speak, though, of what I may not understand, I will speak of what 
I surely don' t understand. I don ' t understand where Murray ' s new book is coming 
from, or why. In speaking of my inability to understand, I will focus on the 
cultural relativism that I thought—mistakenly, I now think—that I learned from 
him. But my befuddlement goes deeper than doctrine. It goes beyond epistemol-
ogy and ontology to temperament. 
In my student days and long, long after, I was often saddened by what seemed 
to me a streak of sadness in Murray. It was not just the bleakness in his words. 
It was the weariness in his sigh, a weariness which somehow caught, more 
piercingly than language ever could, the sorrow of our existence and the certainty 
that the bastards would grind us down. 
In Philosophical Foundations, I find a Murray Murphey I never suspected: 
a cockeyed optimist, who thinks that historians can be and indeed are practitioners 
of a human science, that all of us can and indeed do understand each other across 
cultural divides, and that we can and indeed do, by our cultivation of science, 
steadily improve the quality of our collective life. 
I want to quarrel—or at least suggest a quarrel—with all three of those 
positions. But before I do, I want to confess that I am deeply disoriented by them. 
I am unsettled by what I see in them of Murray, and I am still more unsettled by 
what I discover in my reaction to them of myself. I never expected to find Murray 
a dreamer of hopeful dreams, and I am chagrinned to show myself a curmudgeon. 
At least in regard to myself, the truth hurts. 
I want to quarrel first with Murray's contention that the praxis of historians 
» can be comprehended in the analysis he advances of the natural sciences. 
I have been hanging out with historians, as Murray has not, for the last three 
decades. This difference between us displays, no doubt, his good taste and my bad 
judgment. But it also leaves him writing about historians like a philosopher, not 
like a historian. Despite his profession of pragmatic naturalism—an interpreta-
tion of "the study of the past as it is actually practiced by historians" (293)—he 
practices nothing of the sort. 
Take his treatment of the recent books by Jack Greene and David Hackett 
Fischer, Pursuits of Happiness and Albion's Seed. Murray claims that both books 
instance his insistence that good history rests upon causal theorizing. He 
concedes that the causal theorizing he attributes to the one of these works 
contradicts the causal theorizing he attributes to the other, but he assures us that 
the contradictions "can—and will—be settled by empirical research. [They] are 
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not matters of the scholars' values somehow distorting their vision, of 'prejudice' 
or 'alternative and incommensurable interpretations'" (287). 
Greene's book appeared eight years ago, Fischer's seven. In 1996, the 
resolution of their contradictions has not even begun. The unconcern of historians 
for such resolution is revealing. 
As Murray noted, Fischer promised a second volume that would extend his 
argument to Africa and African-Americans. At the time that he promised that 
second volume, and promised it "soon," many of his canniest colleagues pre-
dicted that such a book would cost Fischer dearly, regardless of the power of its 
argument, because it would be caught in the maelstrom of racial politics. 
I do not say that Fischer has withheld the second volume on account of the 
political considerations that Murray dismisses. But I do observe that no one has 
ever mistaken Fischer for a fool, I do observe that seven years and counting is not 
soon, and I do observe that in the meantime Fischer has published another, very 
different book. Paul Revere's Ride, an unabashed narrative, has brought Fischer 
an acclaim among historians that Albion's Seed never approached. Where 
Murray insisted adamantly, on the evidence of such studies as Albion's Seed, that 
the revival of narrative was a mere fad and that "what is actually happening in the 
historical trade" is that "the narrative is being displaced by analyses of causal 
processes" (285), one of his own chosen exemplars among historians deliberately 
chose to produce the sort of story that Murray maintained was obsolescent in 
sophisticated strata of the profession. 
The other of his own chosen exemplars, Jack Greene, has also published 
another book in the same interim. The Intellectual Construction of America is not 
a narrative, but it does not confront the contradictions between Greene's analysis 
and Fischer's that Murray assured us subsequent scholarship would, either. In 
fact, the most interesting contradictions it conjures are with its author's own 
earlier opus. Intellectual Construction seems willfully to resurrect the notion of 
American exceptionalism that Pursuits of Happiness buried. More than that, it 
abandons even the implicit causal interpretation that Murray manages to tease out 
of the earlier work and confines itself instead to a tantalizing descriptive 
taxonomy. 
My point is that historians—even the best of them—do these sorts of things. 
They are not, as Murray would have them, human scientists. They play. They are, 
by scientific standards, intellectually irresponsible. They throw down theoretical 
gauntlets and then walk away from the empirical work that those theories entail. 
They are not obliged by the logic of their profession to pursue their dispute, and 
neither is anyone else. 
In the years since their books appeared, the differences between Fischer and 
Greene have scarcely been acknowledged, let alone addressed. On the contrary, 
the differences between them echo and reinstate differences that go back more 
than a century, between the germ theorists whom Frederick Jackson Turner 
attacked and the social structuralists whom he represented. The differences 
between them have persisted for more than a century, and will recur perennially, 
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just because they are matters of "values" and "alternative and incommensurable 
interpretations," manifest in the very materials with which the two men work. 
Greene cites virtually everything written in the quarter-century before his own 
account appeared, and virtually nothing written earlier than that. Fischer cites 
virtually nothing written in recent years and dredges up dozens upon dozens of 
works from the late nineteenth century. If the two men do not have different 
politics, different prejudices, and different presumptions, they do take different 
things seriously. They do talk past each other. And their "trade"—their 
discipline, such as it is—has neither the ability nor the will to settle their 
differences. When Murray concludes his discussion of Greene and Fischer by 
reaffirming his faith that "our method of studying the past is the hypothetico-
deductive method, and theories about the past are not different in kind from those 
in other areas of science" (287), he takes historians far more seriously than they 
take themselves. 
I want to quarrel as well with Murray's argument against relativism, though 
I want to quarrel less elaborately on this score because he concedes all that I would 
claim. He grants that cultural variation in standards of truth "is a fact," that there 
is no logical escape from such relativism, and that to ask for one is to ask "the 
wrong question" (315-6). 
So far from seeking a refutation of such relativism, Murray seeks the 
conditions—the experience—that might induce people to give up the diverse, 
often contradictory and incommensurable criteria of truth that provide its foun-
dation. He projects what seems to me a Utopian fantasy in which the scientific 
outlook seduces people from all other cultural commitments by its superior power 
and adequacy. 
On Murray's imagining, science will ultimately seduce people not because 
it convinces them rationally—he concedes that, between science and other modes 
of meeting the world, there can be no rational convincement—but because it 
tempts them emotionally. Its triumphs in restoring health, prolonging life, 
providing food, and otherwise achieving unprecedented control over nature will 
elicit "a 'motivational orientation' superior to any other" (319) and thereby 
convert the world. 
Murray moves, in short, from a theory of knowledge to a speculative 
anthropology of knowledge. He maintains—on no empirical evidence I can 
see—that people prefer one worldview to another on the basis of its capacity to 
satisfy their desires; and he holds—on an oddly one-sided canvass of the 
evidence—that the scientific standard of truth affords that satisfaction. 
Science, he says, confers on its practitioners "a vastly greater control over 
nature . . . than any other system of ideas ever devised by man" (319). Though 
the superiority of the scientific system of ideas cannot be demonstrated, it is or 
will be experienced by peoples everywhere. The experience will induce belief, 
and the advance of the belief is "already... irreversible" (319). It must continue 
"until science becomes universal" (320). Such universality will not constitute a 
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refutation of relativism—nothing, Murray acknowledges, can constitute a refu-
tation of relativism—but it will bring us to a point where relativism will simply 
"cease to be a problem" (320). 
Murray's faith in this prospect of human betterment seems to me as 
implausible and unpersuasive as it is touching. I do not see how he can conceive 
the world we owe to science and its attendant technologies as an irresistibly 
attractive one. 
Even in the prosperous provinces of the West, where people have been the 
beneficiaries of the scientific persuasion, technological spectres from unemploy-
ment to annihilation haunt the waking thoughts of working men and women and 
the night dreads of their children. It is not for nothing that multitudes of 
Americans mistrust the assurances of the scientific establishment on fluoridation 
of their water, on UFOs, on AIDS. It is not for nothing, or an expression of 
invincible irrationality, that an overwhelming popular consensus has precluded 
construction of nuclear power plants for the past two decades. 
Among the vast majorities of the world's populations which have been 
unhinged by a Western imperialism that has commandeered the resources of the 
globe and consigned billions to blighted lives of inferiority, rage, and resent-
ment—or, if you prefer, to tormented lives of ambition, avarice, and discontent— 
the bearers of scientific blessings come with dirty hands. 
Everywhere, experiences of science are equivocal at best. And everywhere 
that equivocality informs people's reluctance to give themselves wholly to 
science. Wherever science has advanced in the last few centuries—the only 
centuries in human history when it has advanced significantly and mattered 
materially—it has been attended by anxieties, rejections, and refusals, from 
Frankenstein to Jurassic Park, from the Luddites to the Greens. 
I can't see how science will ever elicit the universal assent that Murray 
assumes inevitable, because I can't see how it will ever bring the unmitigated 
benefits that he fondly fantasizes. Nowhere in the world, even now, do people 
submit to science as he supposes they do. All around the globe there are 
fundamentalist resurgences that testify to its incompetence to satisfy even their 
material longings, let alone their spiritual hungers. In few places are those 
fundamentalist reversions more profound than in the United States, the place 
where people experience if any people do the best reasons to believe in the power 
and adequacy of science. 
By the logic of Murray's own professed empiricism—and, more, by what I 
always took to be his temper—I'd have thought him bound to heed these 
intimations of our tragic limitations. I am fascinated to find that he is so 
unimpressed by them, and I am even more fascinated to discover that I, of all 
people, am struck by them. 
Murray Murphey always taught me by showing me other and more illumi-
nating ways of coming at worlds I thought I knew. After all these years, he's doing 
it still. 
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I recall hearing him say, more than once, that students should never take more 
than a course or two with a teacher, no matter how fine the teacher, because 
teachers said all they had to say in a course or two. In Philosophical Foundations, 
he holds that the historian's quest is ultimately for rule-governed, law-like 
explanations of behavior. In his own work, he proves that he is ultimately his own 
worst example: still going his own way, breaking all the rules, a law unto himself, 
for the rest of us to struggle to learn from. 
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